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THE MARBURY MYSTERY: 
WHY DID WILLIAM MARBURY SUE IN 
THE SUPREME COURT? 
Susan Low Bloch* 
In 1801, when William Marbury petitioned the Supreme 
Court to issue a writ of mandamus ordering Secretary of State 
James Madison to deliver his commission as justice of the peace, 
he initiated one of the most important cases in the Court's his-
tory. But why did Marbury choose the Supreme Court? Was 
there a lower federal court that could have granted the writ at 
the time? The short answer is "yes." Rather than making an un-
successful attempt to invoke the original jurisdiction of the 
United States Supreme Court, I have learned that he could have 
brought his suit in the then newly-created Circuit Court of the 
District of Columbia. Did Marbury know of this possibility? 
Would the Circuit Court have granted the requested writ of 
mandamus? As this essay will show, the answer to both these 
questions is "probably yes." That being so, the intriguing-
indeed, mysterious-questions surrounding Marbury's choice of 
forum warrant further examination. 
First, a brief recap of the facts of Marbury v. Madison. 1 In 
the waning days of the Federalist Administration of President 
John Adams, the outgoing Federalist Congress enacted the "Act 
Concerning the District of Columbia," authorizing the president 
to appoint as many justices of the peace for D.C. as he thought 
"expedient." Each would serve for five-year terms.2 President 
* Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I want to 
thank my colleague Vicki Jackson and my husband Rich Bloch for helping me edit this 
article, my research assistants, Robert Dean and Caroline Nolan for their research assis-
tance, and Georgetown University Law Center for its generous writing grant and sab-
batical. 
I. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
2. "Act Concerning the District of Columbia," enacted on February 27, 1801, pro-
vided for "such number of discreet persons to be justices of the peace as the President of 
the United States shall from time to time think expedient, to continue in office five 
years." 2 Stat. 103, §11. Under the statute, the justices were to have, "in all matters, civil 
and criminal, and in whatever relates to the conservation of the peace ... all the powers 
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Adams nominated forty-two justices-twenty-three for Wash-
ington County on the Maryland side of the Potomac River and 
nineteen for Alexandria County on the Virginia side.3 After the 
Senate confirmed and the President signed the commissions, it 
was the responsibility of the Secretary of State, John Marshall, to 
affix the Great Seal of the United States to the commissions and 
see to their delivery. The signing and sealing presented no prob-
lem, but time did not permit delivery of all forty-two commis-
sions. Thomas Jefferson assumed the presidency on March 4, 
1801. Appalled at Adams' last minute "court-packing," Jeffer-
son ordered his Secretary of State to withhold the undelivered 
documents.4 Four of those so deprived, William Marbury, Den-
nis Ramsay, William Harper, and Robert Townsend Hooe,5 then 
vested in, and shall perform all the duties required of, justices of the peace, as individual 
magistrates, by the laws herein before continued in force in those parts of [the) district, 
for which they shall have been respectively appointed; and they shall have cognizance in 
personal demands to the value of twenty dollars, exclusive of costs." Id This was only 
one of several efforts by the outgoing Federalists to leave their mark on the judiciary. 
Sec note 27. 
3. George Lee Haskins and Herbert A. Johnson, History of the Supreme Court of 
the United States, Vol. II, Foundations of Power: John Marshall, 1801-15 at 183 (Macmil-
lan, 1981); Donald 0. Dewey, Marshall Versus Jefferson: The Political Background of 
Marbury v. Madison 76 (Knopf, 1970); National Intelligencer (March 9, 1801); Alexan-
dria Advertiser (March 9, 1801). 
4. Dewey. at 80. At the time of this order, Levi Lincoln was serving as Acting Sec-
retary of State as well as Attorney General. James Madison did not take office until May. 
James F. Simon, What Kind of Nation: Thomas Jefferson, John Marshall, and the Epic 
Struggle to Create a United States, 174 (Simon & Schuster, 2002). 
5. Marbury, originally from a well-known Maryland family, had moved to Wash-
ington to work as an aide to the first Secretary of the Navy, Benjamin Stoddert. Dewey, 
Marshall Versus Jefferson at 83 (cited in note 3); John A. Garraty, ed., Quarrels That 
Have Shaped the Constitution 7, 13 (Harper & Row, 1987). For an extensive description 
of Marbury's life, see David F. Forte, Marbury's Travail: Federalist Politics and William 
Marbury's Appointment as Justice of the Peace, 45 Cath. U. L. Rev. 349 (1996). The other 
three petitioners were from Alexandria. Hooe, also from a well-known family, had 
served as mayor of Alexandria, sheriff of Fairfax, and was one of the "boosters" advocat-
ing the advantages of Alexandria-Georgetown as the site of the new capital. Dewey, 
Marshall Versus Jefferson at 84-85 (cited in note 3). Ramsey had served under Washing-
ton in the Revolutionary War, had been a pallbearer at Washington's funeral, and had 
served several terms as mayor of Alexandria. Harper was a significant landholder in Al-
exandria, later elected alderman of the town. All four were involved in the Potomac 
Company, a venture led by George Washington which intended to link the Potomac and 
Ohio Rivers. Id. at 83-85. While these four were not the only ones deprived of their 
commissions, only these four "staunch Federalists" sued. Id. at 83-86. The other thirteen 
took no action, "perhaps because they regarded the positions as insufficiently important 
to make litigation worthwhile." Haskins and Johnson, History of the Supreme Court at 
184 (cited in note 3). Jefferson said that Adams' total of forty-two justices was "too nu-
merous," Journal of the Executive Proceedings of the Senate of the United States of 
America 402-04 (Jan. 6, 1802) ("Senate Executive Journal"). So, on March 18, 1801, Jef-
ferson made recess appointments of thirty justices-fifteen for each county. National In-
telligencer, March 18, 1801. In that total of thirty, he renamed twenty-five from Adams' 
list and added five new ones. Whether that twenty-five from Adams' list were the same 
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sued in December 1801 in the United States Supreme Court, 
seeking a writ of mandamus ordering Secretary of State James 
Madison to deliver their commissions.6 
In a landmark decision establishing the tenets of judicial re-
view of both legislative and executive actions, Chief Justice John 
Marshall,7 writing for a unanimous court, divided his analysis 
twenty-five who actually received delivery of the commissions is not clear, but it seems 
likely to be the case. Why Jefferson thought it is necessary or appropriate to reappoint 
justices who were already serving is also not apparent. Obviously, Marbury and his three 
co-petitioners were not on Jefferson's list. 
On January 6, 1802, with Congress back in session, Jefferson sought to make the rc· 
cess appointments permanent and renominated the same thirty men he had appointed 
the prior year. Senate Executive Journal at 402-404 (January 6, 1802). Several months 
later, on April 5, 1802, Jefferson sent another message to the Senate, indicating that six 
of the Justices of the Peace had resigned and/or refused the appointment. He sought to 
replace them with six nominees. In addition, he noted that in his message of January 6th, 
1802, he had mistakenly inserted the name of John Laird; it should, he said, have been 
Benjamin More: "In the ... message of January 6th, the name of John Laird was inserted 
by mistake, instead of that of Benjamin More, who, (and not John Laird,) had been 
commissioned and qualified as a Justice of the Peace. I therefore beg leave to correct the 
error, by restoring to its place the name of Benjamin More, and nominating him to be a 
Justice of the Peace ... and by withdrawing that of John Laird." Senate Executive Jour-
nal, at 417, April 5, 1802. But it is not clear whether there really had been a mistake. John 
Laird had been on Adams' original list of appointees, sec Senate Executive Journal, 
March 2, 1801, at388, and had been confirmed. Senate Executive Journal, March 3, 1801, 
at 390. But he had not been one of Jefferson's 1801 recess appointments. See National 
Intclligencer, March 18, 1801. Whether Laird was one of the seventeen of Adams' nomi-
nees whose commission was not delivered or whether Jefferson was actually ousting 
someone with a delivered commission cannot be ascertained, but Jefferson clearly was 
doing all he could to get his men in these positions. 
Finally, on April 27, 1802, after numerous unexplained postponements, the Senate 
confirmed all these nominations. Senate Executive Journal, at 422-23, giving each county 
fifteen Justices of the Peace. Ten of those in Washington County and nine of those in 
Alexandria County were Adams' appointees; the other eleven were chosen by Jefferson. 
6. They filed their suit during the December 1801 Term, and the Court issued a 
rule calling upon Madison to show cause at the Court's next term as to why a mandamus 
should not issue. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 137. That next term was scheduled for June 1802, 
but in April 1802, Congress modified the Court's schedule, providing that the Court was 
to meet only once a year, with that session scheduled for the first Monday of February. 
Act of April 29, 1802, An Act to Amend the Judicial System of the United States, 7th 
Cong., Sess. I, ch. 31, §1, 1 Stat. 156-67. Since this Act was passed in April, 1802, Con-
gress was in effect abolishing the June and December 1802 sittings (which had been es-
tablished by the Judiciary Act of 1801, 6th Cong., Sess. II, ch. 4, §1) and thereby effec-
tively recessing the Court for fourteen months. See Haskins and Johnson, History of the 
Supreme Court at 141 (cited in note 3). Congress's decision to abolish the 1802 terms was 
apparently motivated by a desire to delay the Court's consideration of both Marbury's 
petition and the repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801, as discussed in notes 27 and 28. Sec 
Garraty, ed., Quarrels That Have Shaped the Constitution at 13-14 (cited in note 5). 
7. This was one of the first major opinions by Chief Justice Marshall. He had been 
appointed by President Adams on January 20, 1801, after John Jay had refused the ap-
pointment. (Jay had been the first Chief Justice, but had resigned in 1795 to become 
Governor of New York. He declined the reappointment because, he said, the judiciary 
was so defectively designed that it lacked "energy, weight, and dignity." Dewey, Marshall 
versus Jefferson at 51 (cited in note 3).) Marshall was unanimously confirmed on January 
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into three parts. First, he held that the petitioners were entitled 
to their commissions. Second, he concluded that the Secretary 
of State could be the subject of judicial process, including a writ 
of mandamus. Finally, he held that a writ of mandamus was the 
appropriate remedy for the plaintiffs. But, said Marshall, the 
Supreme Court could not constitutionally be given original juris-
diction to issue a writ of mandamus in this type of case. Because 
this case was not within one of the two areas of original jurisdic-
tion specified by Article III of the Constitution, the Court could 
act only as an appellate court in this matter.8 And because Sec-
tion 13 of the Judiciary Act of 17899 purportedly conferred on 
the Supreme Court original jurisdiction to issue writs of manda-
mus in this type of case, Section 13 was unconstitutional. There-
upon, the Court explained at length why it was justified in ren-
dering ineffectual an Act of Congress that it found inconsistent 
with the Constitution. Finally, because it had no jurisdiction in 
this case, the Supreme Court denied the relief sought by Mar-
bury and his colleagues. 10 This was a masterful opinion. Only by 
asking the questions in the order he used, with jurisdiction last, 
and by creatively finding a conflict between Section 13 of the Ju-
diciary Act and Article III of the Constitution,11 could Marshall 
27, 1801. See Albert Beveridge, 2 The Life of John Marshall 557 n.2 (Houghton Mifflin 
Co., 1916); Leonard Baker, John Marshall: A Life in the Law 353-54 (Macmillan, 1974). 
Adams signed Marshall's commission on January 31, 1801. See 6 Marshall Papers 61-62, 
Library of Congress; Beveridge, 2 The Life of John Marshall at 557-58. Marshall accepted 
the commission on Feb. 4, 1801 in a letter to President Adams. See 6 Marshall Papers at 
73. For about a month, from February 4 until President Jefferson's inauguration on 
March 4, Marshall served as both Secretary of State and Chief Justice. In fact, at Jeffer-
son's request, Marshall stayed on slightly longer as Secretary of State. Garraty, ed., 
Quarrels That Have Shaped the Constitution at 4 (cited in note 5); see text accompanying 
note 63. 
8. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 137. Article III provides: "In all cases affecting 
ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be 
Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before 
mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, 
with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make." U.S. 
Canst., Art. III, § 2, cl. 2. 
9. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 73. 
10. The Court's ordering of these issues-merits first followed by jurisdiction-
differed from the order Marbury's lawyer used, see 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 146, 154, and 
angered President Jefferson. See note 63. 
11. To appreciate Marshall's creativity in finding a conflict between Section 12 of 
the Judiciary Act of 1789, one must remember that it was essential the same men who 
wrote Article III in 1787, and then, only two years later, wrote the Judiciary Act of 1789. 
One would think they would have known what they meant in Article III and while Mar-
shall neglected to mention this fact in his opinion in Marbury, it was a point that he em-
phasized in several later landmark cases where he found no constitutional conflict. Thus, 
in Cohens v. Virginia, where Marshall was addressing the constitutionality of another 
section of the same Judiciary Act, section 25, he noted: 
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assert the judicial power to review acts of both the legislative 
and the executive branches without ordering anyone to do any-
thing- and thereby avoid the risk of defianceY It was, by any 
standards, a monumental opinion, far more important than the 
issue that inspired it. 13 
All this is generally well known. But, as suggested above, 
the saga of Marbury v. Madison raises several intriguing ques-
tions. 
1. Was there an alternative forum for Marbury's suit?14 
Having asked this question from the day I started teaching 
this case in Constitutional Law I, I am delighted finally to be 
able to answer it. The answer is: "Yes, without a doubt." On 
February 27, 1801, in the same act in which Congress created the 
office of Justice of the Peace for the District of Columbia, it also 
created the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia, a three-
A contemporaneous exposition of the constitution ... is the judiciary act itself. 
We know that in the Congress which passed that act were many eminent mem-
bers of the Convention which formed the constitution. Not a single individual, 
so far as is known, supposed the part of the act which gives the Supreme Court 
appellate jurisdiction over the judgments of the State Courts in the cases therein 
specified, to be unauthorized by the constitution. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 
264,420 (1821). 
Similarly, in McCulloch v. Maryland, addressing the constitutionality of the Act of Con-
gress creating a national bank, Marshall noted, in support of his conclusion that the Act 
was constitutional: "[T]his can scarcely be considered as an open question, entirely un-
prejudiced by the former proceedings of the nation respecting it. The principle now con-
tested was introduced at a very early perioud of our history, has been recognized by 
many successive legislatures, and has been acted upon by the judicial department, in 
cases of peculiar delicacy, as a law of undoubted obligation .... The power now contested 
was exercised by the first Congress elected under the present constitution." 17 U.S. 316, 
401 (1819). Thus Marshall was clearly aware of the persuasiveness of these arguments -
at least when they supported the constitutionality of a statute. 
12. Susan Low Bloch and Maeva Marcus, John Marshall's Selective Use of History 
in Marbury v. Madison, 1986 Wise. L. Rev. 301. 
13. For more on the background of Marbury v. Madison, see William E. Nelson, 
Marbury v. Madison: The Origins and Legacy of Judicial Review (U. Press of Kansas, 
2000); Charles F. Hobson, The Great Chief Justice: John Marshall and the Rule of Law 
(U. Press of Kansas, 1996); Sylvia Snowiss, Judicial Review and the Law of the Constitu-
tion (Yale U. Press, 1990); James M. O'Fallon, "Marbury," 44 Stan. L. Rev. 219 (1992); 
Susan Low Bloch and Maeva Marcus, John Marshall's Selective Use of History in Mar-
bury v. Madison, 1986 Wise. L. Rev. 301. 
14. This article will occasionally use Marbury's name as a shorthand for all four 
petitioners. The petition raises essentially the same issues for all four men. Their lawyer, 
Charles Lee, could establish that at least three of the commissions had been signed and 
sealed; the status of Ramsay's commission was less clear. Simon, What Kind of Nation at 
180 (cited in note 4). Marbury, at 143 (testimony of Mr. Daniel Brent) (Marbury and 
Hooes commissions were signed, but Ramsay's was not); Marbury, at 146 (James Mar-
shall's affidavit that Hooes' and Harper's commissions were signed and sealed, as dis-
cussed infra at note 60). 
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judge court with both original and appellate jurisdiction. 15 Presi-
dent Adams immediately appointed three men to serve as 
judges: James Marshall, younger brother of John Marshall, the 
recently-appointed Chief Justice of the Supreme Court; William 
Cranch, nephew-in-law of President Adams, who would become 
Chief Judge in 1806 and would serve on the Circuit Court for 54 
years until his retirement in 1855; and Thomas Johnson as Chief 
Judge. 16 Johnson, however, declined the appointment. He had 
been one of the first Supreme Court Justices but had retired in 
1793 because he found riding circuit too arduous. 17 At his re-
tirement, he vowed not to accept any further public office, and 
accordingly declined Adams's appointment to the D.C. Circuit 
Court. Unfortunately for President Adams and the Federalists, 
there was no time for Adams to choose another, so it was Presi-
dent Jefferson who appointed the first Chief Judge of the Circuit 
Court, William Kilty. 
15. The Organic Act of February 27, 1801, An Act Concerning the District of Co· 
lumbia, ch. 15, 2 Stat. 105 (1801). The court was to meet four times per year, in each of 
the two counties that comprised the District of Columbia, Washington County and Alex· 
andria County. Id at § 4. The court was created three months after the federal govern-
ment had moved to the District of Columbia from Philadelphia, a move that had been 
mandated in 1790 when Congress provided that the capital would be located in a district 
not more than ten miles square along the Potomac River, on land ceded to the United 
States by Maryland and Virginia. See "An Act establishing the temporary and perma-
nent seat of the Government of the United States," Act of July 16, 1790, ch. 28, § 1, 1 
Stat. 130 (1790). Under the statute, the government would not actually move there until 
December 1800. Id at § 5-6. 
16. <http://air.fjc.gov/history/judges_frm.html>. Cranch was the son of Mary Smith 
Cranch, the sister of First Lady Abigail Smith Adams. In addition to his long service on 
the Circuit Court, Cranch is also well-known as one of the early reporters of Supreme 
Court decisions, a task he undertook on his own initiative. Frank D. Wagner, The Role of 
the Supreme Court Reporter in History, 26 J. Sup. Ct. Hist. 9, 15 (2001). Indeed, Cranch's 
notes in Marbury have been called "the most significant synopsis by a Reporter of Deci-
sions in United States Reports." ld. at 17-18 (quoting Paul R. Baier and Henry Putzel, 
Jr., A Report on the Reporter, 1980 Sup Ct. Hist. Soc. Y. B. 10, 12). 
17. Clare Cushman, ed., The Supreme Court Justices: Illustrated Biographies 1789-
1993 at 31-35 (Cong. Q., 2d ed. 1995) (Johnson's service on the Supreme Court was the 
shortest in the Court's history.) 
18. Kilty received a recess appointment on March 23, 1801 <http://air. 
fic.gov/servelet>. National Intelligencer, March 23, 1801. He was then renominated and 
confirmed in 1802. Senate Executive Journal 400-401 (Jan. 26, 1802); id. at 405 (Jan. 26, 
1802). 
John Marshall said that he was "excessively mortified" by their not anticipating 
Johnson's refusal: "There was a negligence in that business arising from a confidence that 
Mr. Johnston [sic] would accept, which I lament excessively." Letter from John Marshall 
to James M. Marshall, March 18, 1801, Library of Congress: Marshall Papers, quoted in 
Dewey, Marshall Versus Jefferson at 80 (cited in note 3). Notwithstanding Marshall's 
lament it is not clear the Adams' administration had time to check with Johnson. The 
Act cr~ating the court was signed on February 27, Adams made the nomination on Feb-
ruary 28 (only 3 days before he was to leave office), and the Senate confirmed on March 
3 (the day before Adams left office). Senate Executive Journal 389 (March 3, 1801). 
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Significantly, the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia 
was up and running at least as early as March 23, 1801.19 Thus, 
there is no question the Circuit Court was in business when 
Marbury filed his suit during the United States Supreme Court's 
December 1801 term. Clearly, Marbury and his colleagues could 
have filed their action there. 
2. Why didn't Marbury file his suit in the Circuit Court? 
The question is difficult to answer because it seems not to 
have been discussed by anyone, either then or now. But it is vir-
tually impossible to believe that Marbury was unaware of the 
Circuit Court's existence. The Act creating that court, the Or-
ganic Act of February 27, 1801, was the same one that estab-
lished Marbury's justice of the peace office.20 The newspapers at 
the time printed the full text of the Act, including a description 
of both the Circuit Court and the office of justice of the peace.21 
Moreover, the same newspaper story that announced the ap-
pointment of Marbury and his forty-one brethren also heralded 
the appointments of the three judges for the Circuit Court of the 
District of Columbia.22 In addition, Marbury's lawyer, Charles 
Lee, had been the Attorney General under Adams when the of-
fices of justice of the peace and the Circuit Court were created 
and when these appointments were made. Thus, Marbury and 
his lawyer simply could not have been unaware of the creation 
and staffing of the Circuit Court of D.C.23 
Perhaps Marbury and his lawyer questioned whether the 
Circuit Court could lawfully issue a writ of mandamus to the 
Secretary of State. They may have thought Marbury needed to 
go to the highest court of the land. But there was no basis for 
such a conclusion. Indeed, as subsequent case law revealed, if 
they had such a concern they were doubly wrong: the Supreme 
Court could not issue the writ; the Circuit Court could. 
19. National Intelligencer (March 23, 1801); F. Regis Noel, The Court-House of the 
District of Columbia 10 (The Law Reporter Printing Co., 1939). See, e.g., United States v. 
Hammond, 1 D.C. (1 Cranch) 15 (1801) (court has jurisdiction to try someone for a theft 
that occurred on February 26, 1801, one day before Congress created the court). 
20. See note 2. 
21. See Washington Federalist, (March 10, 1801); Alexandria Advertiser, (March 
11, 1801). 
22. See Washington Federalist, (March 7, 1801). 
23. Interestingly, Charles Lee, Marbury's lawyer, had been appointed by Adams to 
one of the circuit courts created by Congress in the Judiciary Act of February 1801, but 
Lee had declined the appointment. Haskins and Johnson, History of the Supreme Court 
at 132 (cited in note 3). Lee was also a close friend of Marshall, with no fondness for Jef-
ferson. Garraty, ed., Quarrels That Have Shaped the Constitution at 24 (cited in note 5). 
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In 1837, the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia held 
in United States ex rel. Stokes et al. v. Kendall that it had the 
power to issue a writ of mandamus against an executive officer-
and ordered Postmaster General Kendall to comply with his 
statutory duty to pay a government contractor, William Stokes, 
money owed him by the United States.Z4 Stokes and his partners 
had contracted with the government; Congress had authorized 
the Solicitor of the Treasury to pay them, but the Postmaster 
General had paid only a portion of the amount Congress had au-
thorized. The Circuit Court, in an opinion by Chief Judge 
Cranch-the same Judge Cranch who had been on the bench 
since its creation in 1801-issued a writ of mandamus ordering 
the Postmaster General to pay Stokes the remainder. 25 
In concluding that it had the power to issue this order, the 
Circuit Court relied on the Act of February 27, 1801, the Act 
that had created the Circuit Court of the District and had given 
it "cognizance of all cases in law and equity, whether arising un-
der the constitution or laws of the United States, or under the 
adopted laws of Virginia and Maryland, with the only condition 
that one of the parties shall be resident, or found within the dis-
trict. "26 Cranch noted that, in creating this Circuit Court of the 
District of Columbia, Congress had given it "all the powers 
vested in the circuit courts, and the judges of the circuit courts," 
and that at the time of its creation, February 27, 1801, all the cir-
cuit courts did have these broad powers because the Judiciary 
Act of 1801, enacted two weeks earlier, had so provided.Z7 Chief 
24. United States ex rei. Stokes v. Kendall, 26 F. Cas. 702 (1837). 
25. On the bench with Cranch in 1837 was James Stewart Morsel!. Thruston was 
absent. Id. at 754. 
26. 26 F. Cas. at 706 (emphasis added) (referring to the the fifth section of the act of 
February 27 which provides: "[The circuit court of the District of Columbia] shall have 
cognizance of all crimes and offences committed within the said district, and of all cases 
in law and equity between parties, both or either of which shall be resident, or shall be 
found within the said district.") 
27. Two weeks before creating the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia, Con-
gress, on February 13, 1801, enacted the "Judiciary Act of 1801," 2 Stat. 90, a bill that 
significantly modified the judicial structure created by the Judiciary Act of 1789. Under 
the 1789 structure, the judicial districts of the United States had been grouped into three 
circuits-Eastern, Middle, and Southern. Each circuit court was held by two justices of 
the Supreme Court (after 1793, by one justice) and the district judge of the district in 
which the court was sitting. Act of Sept. 24,1789, ch. 20, § 4,1 Stat. 74-75, as modified by 
Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22, sec 1, 1 Stat. 333. The new Judiciary Act of 1801 grouped 
the districts into six circuits, expanded their jurisdiction, freed the Justices from circuit 
duty, and created sixteen new circuit court judgeships to replace the now liberated Jus-
tices. 2 Stat. 89, ch. 4, § 6, 7. See Kathryn Turner Preyer's study of the Judiciary Act of 
1801 in Kathryn Turner, The Midnight Judges, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 494 (1961). The 1801 
Act also provided that when the next vacancy on the Supreme Court occurred, it should 
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Judge Cranch concluded that even though Congress had the Ju-
diciary Act of 1801 repealed in 1802, and had reinstated the 
prior, more restricted, jurisdiction of the circuit courts/8 the re-
peal did not affect the powers of the Circuit Court of the District 
of Columbia because it had been established on February 27, 
1801 and was unaffected by the 1802 repeal.29 Cranch concluded 
that the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia was different 
not be filled, thereby prospectively reducing the Court from six justices to five. See Judi-
ciary Act of February 13, 1801, ch. 4, § 3, 2 Stat. 89. (This reduction was apparently an 
attempt to limit newly-elected President Jefferson's ability to appoint a Supreme Court 
judge. Garraty, ed., Quarrels That Have Shaped the Constitution at 8 (cited in note 5).) 
President Adams quickly filled these sixteen new judgeships with the "midnight judges;" 
Republicans threatened to repeal the law as soon as they could, Dewey, Marshall Versus 
Jefferson at 62 (cited in note 3), and, as noted in note 28, they did so in 1802, by a strictly 
partisan vote: 59 Republicans favor; 32 Federalists against. Haskins and Johnson, His-
tory of the Supreme Court at 164 (cited in note 3). 
28. The Judiciary Act of 1801 had been an irritant to the Republicans from the out-
set. While many thought the improvements were necessary and desirable, they resented 
Adams' ability to appoint sixteen new Federalist judges in the waning hours of his presi-
dency. On December 8, 1801, in his first annual message to Congress, President Jeffer-
son urged Congress to repeal the 1801 Act. From January to March 1802, Congress de-
bated whether it could abolish these courts and, if it could, what would become of the 
judges whose terms were to be held, according to the Act "during good Behaviour." 
Dewey, Marshall Versus Jefferson at 64 (cited in note 3). Eventually, Congress decided 
that repeal was constitutional, that the "midnight judges" could lose their positions, and 
it promptly repealed the entire Judiciary Act of 1801, "revived" the former judicial sys-
tem, and provided that all actions pending in the now repealed courts "shall be continued 
over to the prior courts they would have been heard in before the Judiciary Act of 1801 
was enacted." Act of March 8, 1802, 7th Cong., Sess. I, Ch. 8, 1 Stat. 132 (1802), entitled 
"An Act to Repeal Certain Acts Respecting the Organization of the Courts of the 
United States." On April 29, 1802, Congress modified the Supreme Court's schedule so 
that it would meet once a year commencing on the first Monday of February, 1803. See 
note 6. As indicated, that meant no Supreme Court sessions in all of 1802. 
The constitutionality of the repeal was immediately challenged by a party in one of 
the transferred cases and was upheld by the Supreme Court in Stuart v. Laird in 1803. 5 
U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803). See Haskins and Johnson, History of the Supreme Court at 
180-81 (cited in note 3). In an opinion by Justice William Paterson, (Marshall had 
recused himself because, according to Cranch, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 308, Marshall had 
tried the case below), the Court held that Congress has discretion to "establish from time 
to time such inferior tribunals as they may think proper, and to transfer a cause from one 
such tribunal to another." 5 U.S. at 309 (1803). Further, the Court upheld the practice of 
Supreme Court justices' riding circuit, rejecting the argument that it was unconstitutional 
to give Supreme Court justices original jurisdiction on the Circuit Courts. The Court re-
lied on past practice and acquiescence: "practice and acquiescence ... for a period of 
several years, commencing with the organization of the judicial system, affords an irre-
sistible answer, and have indeed fixed the construction. It is a contemporary interpreta-
tion of the most forcible nature. This practical exposition is too strong and obstinate to 
be shaken or controlled. Of course, the question is at rest, and ought not now to be dis-
turbed." 5 U.S. at 309. For the relationship between Marbury and Stuart v. Laird, which 
came down one week after Marbury, see Dean Alfange, Jr., Marbury v. Madison, and 
Original Understandings of Judicial Review: In Defense of Traditional Wisdom, 1993 Sup. 
Ct. Rev. 329; O'Fallon, Marbury,44 Stan. L. Rev. at 219 (cited in note 13); Nelson, Mar-
bury v. Madison at 67-70 (cited in note 13). 
29. Kendall, 26 F. Cas. at 707. 
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from the other circuit courts. Cranch thus distinguished Mcintire 
v. Wood, 30 in which the Supreme Court had found that, because 
of the repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801, circuit courts generally 
did not have power to mandamus a government official. Said 
Judge Cranch for the D.C. court in Kendall: 
Here is a case in which a ministerial act is necessary to the 
completion of an individual right under the laws of the United 
States. The right of the relators, and the obligation of the 
postmaster-general are clear and absolute. It is a case ia law; 
and the only appropriate remedy is a writ of mandamus. This 
is the only judicial tribunal which can take original cognizance 
of the case and apply the proper remedy. How, then, can this 
court refuse it? To refuse it would be a denial of justice .... 
The proceeding by mandamus is a remedy given by that 
common law which was in force in Maryland and Virginia on 
the 27th of February, 1801, and continued in force in this dis-
trict by the act of congress of that date, and which is still in 
force here. If a case is made out, in which, according to that 
law, the proceeding by mandamus is the proper remedy, this 
. b d . 31 court IS oun to grant It. 
The following year, the Supreme Court agreed. Writing for 
the Court in Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 32 Justice 
Smith Thompson held that Congress, in creating the D.C. Circuit 
Court in February 27, 1801, clearly gave that court jurisdiction of 
"all cases in law or equity, arising under the constitution and 
laws of the United States, [and] the power to issue a writ of 
mandamus in all such cases warranting such relief. "33 The Su-
preme Court concluded that mandamus was appropriate in this 
case, relying on sections 1, 3, and 5 of the February 27th Act and 
reasoning along the same lines as Chief Judge Cranch. Section 1 
provided that the Circuit Court was to apply the laws of the state 
of Maryland because it was sitting in that part of the District 
when it was considering the mandamus petition. Section 3 pro-
30. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 504 (1813). 
31. 26 F. Cas. 702. 
32. Kendall v. United States ex rei. Stokes, 37 U.S. 524 (1838). It is interesting to 
note that the Supreme Court, in affirming the Circuit Court, asked first whether the rela-
tors were entitled to a writ of mandamus, and second whether the circuit court had juris-
diction of the case and the authority to issue the writ. Id. at 609. This is, of course, the 
same sequence that Marshall used in Marbury, a sequence that we find unusual today 
and that so angered Jefferson. See note 59. 
33. Kendall, 37 U.S. at 625 (Thompson, joined by Story, Baldwin, McLean, Wayne, 
and McKinley). Three justices, Taney, Barbour, and Catron dissented, because, in their 
view, Congress had not given the D.C. Circuit Court the power to issue a writ of manda-
mus to an executive officer. I d. at 627, 642. 
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vided that the D.C. Circuit Court was to "have all the powers by 
law vested in the circuit courts, and the judges of the circuit 
courts of the United States."34 At the time of this enactment, 
February 27, 1801, the Judiciary Act of 1801 was in effect, giving 
the circuit courts of the whole country "cognizance of all cases in 
law or equity, arising under the constitution and laws of the 
United States;" that is, "the whole judicial power, in cases arising 
under the constitution and laws. "35 That Congress later repealed 
the Judiciary Act of 1801 did not retroactively affect the jurisdic-
tion of the Circuit Court of the District: 
[The repeal of the Act of February 13, 1801 ,] fifteen months 
afterwards, and after the court in this district had been organ-
ized and gone into operation, under the act of 27th of Febru-
ary, 1801, could not, in any manner, affect that law, any fur-
ther than was provided by the repealing act. To what law was 
the circuit court of this district to look for the powers vested 
in the circuit courts of the United States, by which the court 
was to be governed, during the time the act of the 13th of Feb-
ruary was in force? Certainly to none other than that act. 
And whether the time was longer or shorter before that law 
was repealed, could make no difference .... [S]uch adoption 
has always been considered as referring to the law existing at 
the time of adoption; and no subsequent legislation has ever 
been supposed to affect it. And such must necessarily be the 
effect and operation of such adoption. No other rule would 
furnish any certainty as to what was the law.36 
Thus, while we don't know whether or not Marbury and his 
lawyer questioned the powers of the Circuit Court, we do know, 
with the benefit of hindsight offered by Marbury and Kendall, 
that the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia could have is-
sued a writ of mandamus against an executive officer including 
the Secretary of State. 
3. What would the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia have 
done had Marbury and his co-petitioners filed suit there? 
There is good reason to believe Marbury and his colleagues 
would have prevailed in the Circuit Court. As just observed, the 
34. Id. at 624. 
35. Id. at 625; see§ 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1801. 
36. Kendall, 37 U.S. at 625. Interestingly, Attorney General Butler, arguing that the 
Circuit Court did not have jurisdiction in the Kendall case, said that if it had such juris-
diction, surely William Marbury would have brought his mandamus action there instead 
of in the Supreme Court. Kendall, 26 F. Cas. at 724 (letter of Attorney General as part of 
the answer of Postmaster-General Kendall). 
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D.C. Circuit had the authority to mandamus executive officials. 
Moreover precedent reveals that the Circuit Court never ques-
tioned its authority to issue a writ of mandamus when warranted. 
Thus, for example, when an insurance company asked the D.C. 
Circuit Court in 1801 to mandamus the Bank of Alexandria to 
order it to issue stock, the Circuit Court refused because, the 
majority concluded, the insurance company had an available le-
gal remedy: namely, sue the bank for damages, use the moneys 
awarded to purchase the stock claimed, and sue for additional 
damages if the bank continued to refuse to "open its books."37 
But, significantly, the Court did not question its authority to is-
sue a writ if there were no remedy at law. In fact, Chief Judge 
Kilty dissented and would have issued the writ, because he ques-
tioned whether there really was an adeguate remedy at law.38 
Further, in United States v. Washington,39 when the treasurer of 
Washington County sought a writ of mandamus in 1819 ordering 
the mayor of Washington to pay one-half the cost of rebuilding a 
bridge over Rock Creek, pursuant to an act of Congress,40 the 
Court issued the writ because there was no adequate remedy at 
law.41 
Moreover, Chief Judge Cranch's opinion in the Kendall case 
in 1837 implicitly suggests that, had William Marbury applied 26 
years earlier, the Circuit Court would have been inclined to 
grant the writ. In his opinion for the Circuit Court in Kendall, 
Cranch emphasized the importance of having some court that 
could remedy all legal wrongs, including wrongs by federal offi-
cers. In particular, he was adamant as to the Circuit Court's 
power to issue a writ of mandamus in this type of case to remedy 
an otherwise irreparable injury: 
If a case is made out, in which, according to that law, the pro-
ceeding by mandamus is the proper remedy, this court is 
bound to grant it .... If this court has not jurisdiction of the 
case, no court has; and an individual who may have been ru-
ined by the refusal of an officer to perform a ministerial act, 
positively enjoined upon him by law, will be entirely without 
37. United States v. Bank of Alexandria, 24 F. Cas. 982 (1801). 
38. ld. at 984. 
39. United States v. Washington, 28 F. Cas. 414 (1819). 
40. Act of 1st of July, 1812, § 12, 2 Stat. 773 
41. Washington, 28 F. Cas. at 414. See also Kennedy v. Washington, 14 F. Cas. 330 
(1829) (declining to issue a writ because the defendants had discretion; thus, there was no 
ministerial duty for the court to command). 
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redress.42 
To be sure, Cranch wrote this in 1837 with the benefit of 
Chief Justice John Marshall's views in Marbury. In fact, Cranch 
quoted liberally from that opinion, emphasizing the importance 
of having some court with power to remedy a wrong and noting 
the difference between political actions of an executive official, 
with which the judiciary should not interfere, and ministerial ac-
tions, which the courts may review.43 The Circuit Court might 
have been more timid in the early 1800's, possibly concluding it 
did not have the power to mandamus the Secretary of State. 
Admittedly, for the Circuit Court to decide after Marbury that it 
can mandamus a Postmaster General does not clearly tell us 
what it would have done with an 1801 request to mandamus the 
Secretary of State. Cranch and his colleagues might have con-
sidered ordering a Secretary of State to do his duty as different 
from ordering a Postmaster General to do his. Indeed, Cranch 
notes in the Kendall case: 
The suggestion that the president and heads of departments 
are not responsible, except by impeachment, for the exercise 
of their ministerial functions, seems to imply that the post-
master-general, like the heads of departments, may shelter 
himself under the authority or command of the president. 
But if they can do it, in a case like the present, where the duty 
is expressly enjoined by an act of congress, this officer cannot 
do it; for his relation to the president is very different from 
theirs. They, in the very terms by which their offices were 
created and their duties defined, are to perform such duties 
and execute such orders as they shall be required to perform 
and execute by the president of the United States .... The 
postmaster-general, however, clearly bears no such relation to 
the president. ... The postmaster-general, in the exercise of 
the duties of his office, appears to be legally as independent of 
the president as the president is of him. There can, therefore, 
be no pretence for avoiding responsibility under any order of 
the president, nor for showing the irresponsibility which may 
be supposed to belong to that high officer.44 
42. Kendall, 26 F. Cas. at 707,714. 
43. Id. at 707-10, quoting Marshall in Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 163-73. 
. 44. Id. at 713-14. Justice Thompson, writing for the Supreme Court in Kendall, was 
m accord: 
There are certain political duties imposed upon many officers in the executive 
department, the discharge of which is under the direction of the President. But 
it would be an alarming doctrine, that congress cannot impose upon any execu-
tive off1cer any duty they may thmk proper, which is not repugnant to any rights 
secured and protected by the constitution; and in such cases, the duty and re-
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Summarizing, then, if we cannot be certain how the 1801 
Circuit Court would have responded to a petition by Marbury 
and his co-petitioners; we can nevertheless make several obser-
vations with confidence: 
a. When Marbury and his co-petitioners tried to invoke the 
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court during the December 
1801 term, they could have filed their petition instead in the Cir-
cuit Court of the District of Columbia. That court was created, 
fully staffed, and functioning well before December 1801.45 
b. We know from Marbury v. Madison that, in a federal 
court with appropriate jurisdiction, a writ of mandamus ordering 
the Secretary of State to perform a ministerial duty was appro-
priate.46 
c. We also know from Marbury that delivery of these com-
missions was a ministerial act and that William Marbury and his 
colleagues were entitled to a writ of mandamus ordering the Sec-
retary of State to deliver their commissions.47 
d. Finally, we know from the Kendall cases, both in the Cir-
cuit Court and in the Supreme Court, that the Circuit Court had 
jurisdiction to hear a case like Marbury's and to issue a writ of 
mandamus against a federal officer.48 And we know from United 
States v. Washington, 49as well as Kendall, that the Circuit Court 
was willing and able to issue writs of mandamus when the facts 
warranted such a remedy. We cannot conclude, with the same 
degree of confidence, that it would have actually issued the writ 
requested by Marbury, but there is no evidence suggesting oth-
erwise. On the contrary, as discussed above, the Circuit Court 
showed no reluctance to issue such writs in the absence of an 
adequate remedy at law. 
4. What if Marbury and his co-petitioners had filed their suit ini-
tially in the Circuit Court and it had issued the writ and ordered 
Secretary of State Madison to deliver the commissions? 
Several scenarios are possible: 
sponsibility grow out of and are subject to the control of the law, and not to the 
direction of the President. And this is emphatically the case, where the duty en-
joined is of a mere ministerial character. 37 U.S. at 610. 
45. Susan Low Bloch and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Celebrating the 200th Anniversary 
of the District of Columbia Circuit, 90 Geo. L.J. 549, 550-52 (2002). 
46. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 171-73. 
47. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 173. 
48. Kendall, 37 U.S. at 618. 
49. Washington, 28 F. Cas. at 414. See note 41. 
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Secretary of State Madison might have complied with the 
judicial mandate and delivered the commissions; Marbury and 
his co-petitioners would have become justices of the peace for 
the remainder of their five-year term. But this alternative is not 
only unlikely, it also would have fallen short of what Marbury 
achieved. We would have learned that the judiciary can man-
damus the executive branch, but we would have learned nothing 
about judicial review of legislative action. 
Alternatively, Secretary of State Madison might have ap-
pealed the Circuit Court's decision to the United States Supreme 
Court.50 Judging from what the Court said in Marbury, and later 
in Kendall, it seems likely that it would have affirmed the Circuit 
Court's decision. This would have confirmed the power of the 
judiciary to review the legality of acts of the executive branch 
and to mandamus the Secretary of State. But the case would 
have provided no obvious opportunity for the Supreme Court to 
establish the power to review the constitutionality of acts of 
Congress, because no constitutionally questionable legislation 
would have been involved. It also would have presented the risk 
of presidential defiance. 
The risk of defiance by Jefferson and Madison, as well as 
congressional impeachment, was real. Jefferson never hid his 
disdain for Marshall's decision in Marbury or for Marshall gen-
erally.51 Impeachment was also in the air. 52 Congress, by a 
50. The Supreme Court had appellate jurisdiction to review such actions by the Cir-
cuit Court. Sec Act of February 27, 1801, 2 Stat. 103, Ch. 15, §8 ("Be it further enacted, 
that any final judgment, order or decree in said circuit court, wherein the matter in dis-
pute, exclusive of costs, shall exceed the value of one hundred dollars, may be re-
examined and reversed or affirmed in the supreme court of the United States .... "). 
51. In a letter to Albert Gallatin in 1810, Jefferson wrote about Marshall: "The 
judge's inveteracy is profound, and his mind of that gloomy malignity which will never let 
him forego the opportunity of satiating it on a victim." T. Jefferson to A. Gallatin, Sept. 
27, 1810 in H. Adams, cd., 1 The Writings of Albert Gallatin 492 (Philadelphia, 1879). 
See also Jefferson's complaint about Marshall years after Marbury. In Cohens v. 
Virginia, 19 U.S. 264 (1821), Marshall used a similar tactic of establishing strong powers 
for the Court to review state court judgments, but then affirming the state court judg-
ment so that, again, no one could defy anything. In a letter to Judge Johnson complaining 
about this tactic, Jefferson wrote: 
This practice of Judge Marshall, of traveling out of his case to prescribe what 
the law would be in a moot case not before the court, is very irregular and very 
censurable. I recollect another instance, and the more particularly, perhaps, be-
cause It m some measure bore on myself. Among the midnight appointments of 
peace for Alexandria. These were signed and sealed by him, but not delivered. I 
found them on the table of the department of State, on my entrance into the of-
fice, and I forbade their delivery. Marbury, named in one of them, applied to 
the Supreme Court for a Mandamus to the Secretary of State (Mr. Madison), to 
deliver the commission intended for him. The Court determined at once that 
being an original process, they had no cognizance of it; and there the qudstion 
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strictly partisan vote, had just repealed the Judiciar¥: Act of 1801 
and eliminated the Supreme Court's 1802 Sessions. 3 The possi-
bility of presidential defiance and impeachment was averted by 
the actual Marbury decision because the Court found it had no 
jurisdiction and therefore did not order the executive branch to 
do anything. Marshall might have found a similarly clever way 
to avoid a confrontation with the President even if Marbury had 
initially sued in the Circuit Court and the Circuit Court had is-
sued the writ. 
Thus, if Marshall were concerned with the possibility that 
Jefferson and Madison might defy the courts and thereby 
weaken the judiciary, he might have endeavored to avoid affirm-
ing the lower court opinion. And, if he wanted the opportunity 
to establish the power to review the constitutionality of federal 
legislation, we know from his Marbury decision that he was 
clever enough to find a constitutional conflict. Given Marshall's 
ability to discover the constitutional problem with section 13 of 
the Judiciary Act of 1789 in the actual Marbury case,54 he might 
before them was ended. But the Chief Justice went on to lay down what the law 
would be, had they jurisdiction of the case; to wit, that they should command 
the delivery. The object was clearly to instruct any other court having the juris-
diction, what they should do, if Marbury should apply to them. Besides the im-
propriety of the of the gratuitous interference, could any thing exceed the per-
version of law? For if there is any principle of law never yet contradicted, it is 
that delivery is one of the essentials to the validity of the deed. Although signed 
and sealed, yet as long as it remains in the hands of the party himself, it is in fieri 
only, it is not a deed, and can be made so only by its delivery. In the hands of 
the third person it may be made an escrow. But whatever is in the executive of-
fices is certainly deemed to be in the hands of the President; and in this case, 
was actually in my hands, because, when I countermanded them, there was as 
yet no Secretary of State. Yet this case of Marbury and Madison is continually 
cited by bench and bar, as if it were settled law, without any animadversion on 
its being merely an obiter dissertation of the Chief Justice. 
Thomas Jefferson Randolph, ed., Memoir, Correspondence, and Miscellanies, From the 
Papers of Thomas Jefferson (Gray and Bowen, 2d ed 1830). 
52. The House of Representatives had impeached District Judge John Pickering at 
the beginning of the 1803 session and was talking about impeaching Supreme Court Jus-
tice Samuel Chase. There were also threats to impeach Marshall if he were to decide in 
favor of Marbury. Haskins and Johnson, History of the Supreme Court at 185 (cited in 
note 3). 
53. See notes 6, 28. 
54. The cleverness-some say "audacity" -of Marshall's approach to Marbury's 
petition has been widely noted and discussed. Sec, e.g., Robert J. Pushaw, Justiciability 
and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 Cornell L. Rev. 393 (1996) 
(viewing the mandamus power of section 13 as best read to apply only to cases over 
which the Court already has acquired jurisdiction); Dean Alfange, Jr., Marbury v. Madi-
son and Original Understandings of Judicial Review: In Defense of Traditional Wisdom, 
1993 Sup. Ct. Rev. 329, 366 (same); Akil Reed Amar, Marbury, Section 13, and the 
Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 443 (1989); William Wins-
low Crosskey and Leonard W. Levy, Original Intent and the Framers' Constitution 75 
(Macmillan, 1988) (Marbury is "one of the most flagrant specimens of judicial activism 
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have been able to find some minor constitutional infirmity with 
the Act creating the Circuit Court of D.C. 
It is possible, therefore, that, even if Marbury and his col-
leagues had sued initially in the Circuit Court, we would have 
reached the same outcome. But getting there would have been, 
at the least, more difficult and maybe impossible. It would have 
required the "right" moves by more people, including a decision 
by Jefferson and Madison to appeal an adverse ruling by the 
Circuit Court, not just to ignore it. Judging from the fact that 
defendant Madison never even appeared in the Supreme Court 
when Marbury sued him there,55 and from indications that Jef-
ferson and Madison were, in fact, prepared to ignore an order 
from the Supreme Court,56 the likelihood of their either comply-
ing with a Circuit Court order or appealing from the Circuit 
Court to the Supreme Court seems remote. 
In truth, the only realistic way to arrive at the results 
achieved in Marbury v. Madison was for Marbury and his col-
leagues to sue originally in the Supreme Court, not the Circuit 
Court, to seek relief from Justice John Marshall, not Judge 
James Marshall. Because they did so, the Supreme Court was 
able to establish the power of judicial review of both executive 
and legislative actions without ordering anyone to do anything 
and without providing any opportunity for turmoil, resistance, or 
defiance. Moreover, the Supreme Court could do so economi-
cally, without having to rely on procedural "assistance" by any 
Jeffersonians. So tidy and elegantly wrapped was this package 
as to inspire one final question. 
5. Was the result reached in Marbury v. Madison contemplated, 
foreseen, or orchestrated by any of the participants in this drama? 
and ... one of the worst opinions ever delivered by the Supreme Court"); Susan Low 
Bloch and Maeva Marcus, John Marshall's Selective Use of History in Marbury v. Madi-
son, 1986 Wise. L. Rev. 301; Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 373, 
389 & n.60 (1982) (Marshall's interpretation of section 13 is "intellectually dishonest"); 
William Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 Duke L.J. 1. 
Beveridge applauded the decision: "(B]y a coup as bold in design and as daring in execu-
tion as that by which the constitution had been framed, John Marshall set up a landmark 
in American history." Beveridge, 3 The Life of John Marshall at 142 (cited in note 7) 
55. Madison never appeared in the Supreme Court, but Attorney General Levi 
Lincoln, who had been Acting Secretary of State before Madison arrived in town, did 
answer the Court's inquiries concerning what he knew of the non-delivery of the com-
missions. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 143-145. Haskins and Johnson, History of the 
Supreme Coun at 191-92 (cited in note 3). 
56. Id. at 185. 
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In theory, there are two interrelated ways in which the par-
ticipants might have foreseen and arguably manipulated events 
to enable John Marshall to achieve the results reached in Mar-
bury v. Madison. First, John, and possibly his brother, might 
have deliberately failed to deliver some of the commissions be-
fore John left the office of Secretary of State. Second, whether 
or not the failure to deliver was deliberate, John Marshall might 
have recognized the opportunity for the Supreme Court to rule 
on the big issues and encouraged Marbury and his colleagues to 
sue in the United States Supreme Court instead of the Circuit 
Court of the District. Is there any evidence to support either 
possibility? Several facts are, while not dispositive, at least in-
triguing. 
As noted earlier, responsibility for delivering the freshly-
signed commissions fell to the then-Secretary of State-and 
newly-installed Chief Justice of the Supreme Court-John Mar-
shall who, apparently, ran out of tirne.57 But brother James, 
newly-appointed judge on the newly-created Circuit Court of the 
District of Columbia, also played a role in the delivery-and 
nondelivery. Specifically, on March 4, 1801, the day of Thomas 
Jefferson's inauguration, Judge James Marshall was informed 
that there was "reason to apprehend riotous proceedings" in Al-
exandria and wanted to ensure that there would be justices of 
the peace available to deal with any troublemakers. 58 He went to 
the Secretary of State's office and signed a receipt for several 
commissions, intending to deliver them.59 However, "finding that 
he could not conveniently carry the whole," he returned several 
commissions undelivered and crossed out those names from his 
receipt.60 Among the undelivered commissions James Marshall 
returned were those of Robert Townsend Hooe and William 
Harper,61 who would soon unite with their colleagues, William 
57. See Letter from John Marshall to James Marshall (cited in note 18 and quoted 
in note 18), noting that he should have delivered the commissions "bur for the extreme 
hurry of the time & the absence of Mr. Wapner [clerk in the Office of Secretary of 
State.]. Dewey, Marshall Versus Jefferson at 79-80 (cited in note 3). 
58. This information comes from the affidavit filed by James Marshall which Mar-
bury's attorney, Charles Lee, read to the Court. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 145-46. 
59. James Marshall's affidavit stated that on March 4, 1801, he went to the office of 
the Secretary of State to pick up the commissions of the justices of the peace. He be-
lieved he picked up twelve of the nineteen Alexandria commissions. Marbury v. Madi-
son, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 145-46 (1803). See also, Dewey, Marshall Versus Jefferson at 
79 (cited in note 3). 
60. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 146; Dewey, Marshall Versus Jefferson at 79 
(cited in note 3). Lee used James Marshall's affidavit to confirm that the commissions 
had in fact been signed and sealed. 
61. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 146 (affidavit of James Marshall); Garraty, ed., 
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Marbury and Dennis Ramsay, to seek help from the Supreme 
Court.62 
Moreover, it is interesting to note that John Marshall had 
somewhat more time to deliver these commissions than is com-
monly believed. The usual assumption is that time was prohibi-
tively short because the justices of the peace were confirmed on 
March 3, Adams' last day in office. But President Jefferson 
asked Marshall to remain as Secretary of State for one more 
day.63 Marshall, therefore, had a little extra time to deliver the 
remaining commissions. 
John Marshall was clearly aware of the fact that some com-
missions had not been delivered. He says, in hindsight, that he 
thought the lack of delivery was not that big a deal. In a letter to 
his brother James, written March 18, 1801, two weeks after these 
events, John Marshall wrote: 
I did not send out the commissions because I apprehended 
such as were for a fixd (sic) time to be completed when signd 
(sic) & seald (sic) & such as depended on the will of the Presi-
dent might at any time be revokd (sic). To with hold the 
commission of the Marshal [of the District] is equal to displac-
ing him which the President I presume has the power to do; 
but to with hold the commission of the Justices is an act of 
which I entertaind (sic) no suspicion. I shoud (sic) however 
have sent out the commissions which had been signd (sic) & 
seald (sic) but for the extreme hurry of the time & the ab-
sence of Mr. Wagner [clerk in the office of Secretary of State] 
who had been called on by the President to act as his private 
secretary. 64 
As this letter indicates, John Marshall both knew that some 
commissions had not been delivered and, more significantly, had 
already formulated the theory he was to use as Chief Justice for 
concluding that delivery was not necessary to complete the ap-
pointment of the Justices of the Peace. This view was an essen-
tial step in the argument justifying the conclusion that delivery 
was a ministerial, not discretionary, act that could be ordered by 
a writ of mandamus. Thus, it is at least possible that in the wan-
ing hours of the Adams' Administration, John Marshall, with or 
without his brother James, knowingly withheld the delivery of 
Quarrels That Have Shaped the Constitution at 10-13 (cited in note 5). 
62. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 137. 
63. Dewey, Marshall Versus Jefferson at 44 (cited in note 3). 
64. Letter from John Marshall to James M. Marshall at 90 (cited in note 18). 
626 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 18:607 
some commissions to set the stage for this profoundly important 
case in our country's legal foundation. 
It is also possible (and more likely) that Marbury and his 
colleagues knowingly chose to sue in the Supreme Court, and 
not the Circuit Court, precisely because the Supreme Court 
could use the case in the manner it did. Sometime before De-
cember 1801, Chief Justice Marshall might have foreseen that he 
could use the case in the manner he eventually did and might 
have let it be known that suing in the Supreme Court was the 
preferred course. As noted, he had already articulated an im-
portant aspect of the Marbury logic. 
Moreover, the case for "orchestration" is strengthened by 
the fact that, notwithstanding Marshall's clear declaration in 
Marbury of Marbury and his colleagues' right to the commis-
sions and to a writ of mandamus from an appropriate court, 
none of the petitioners appears to have pursued his quest. Why 
not? Close to three years remained of their five-year term. 
Armed with the Chief Justice's opinion, they could have easily 
marched into the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia and 
sought the writ.65 If Marbury and his co-petitioners were so anx-
ious for the office, sufficiently so to take their case to the highest 
court of the land, why, when it seemed so available, did none of 
them pursue it? The justice of the peace position was, it is true, a 
relatively low level job, but it was an important stepping stone to 
higher office and, however modest, appeared to be perceived by 
the litigants as desirable.66 lt is not unduly cynical to question the 
true mission of their Supreme Court suit: Did they really want 
these commissions or were they simply being good Federalists 
giving John Marshall the perfect vehicle by which to establish 
65. From the time of the Marbury decision on February 24, 1803 until November 
16, 1803, the composition of the circuit court remained the same: Kilty, Cranch, and 
James Marshall. After James Marshall resigned in November, he was replaced by Nicho-
las Fitzhugh, who took his seat on November 25, 1803. 
66. For a description of duties of justice of the peace, see note 2. According to 
Dewey, in the areas of the District outside the towns of Alexandria and Georgetown, the 
justices of the peace were the principal governing body. Dewey, Marshall Versus Jeffer· 
son at 81 (cited in note 3). Dewey also says, quoting Charles Sydnor, that in Virginia poli-
tics "admission to the office of justice of the peace [or magistrate] ... [was] the first up-
ward step in a political career .... " Apparently, this step had been taken by George 
Washington, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, George Wythe, and George Mason. 
Dewey, Marshall Versus Jefferson at 82 (cited on note 3). President James Monroe evi-
dently thought it worthwhile to serve as a magistrate even after he left the White House. 
Id.; Daniel C. Gilman, Giants of America: The Founding Fathers Series 231-32 (Arlington 
House, 1970); See also Forte, 45 Cath. U. L. Rev. at 354 (cited in note 5). On the other 
hand, as James Simon has noted, none of the four petitioners in Marbury needed the 
money from the job. Simon, What Kind of Nation at 175 (cited in note 4). 
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the powers of the Court? It certainly fit well into Marshall's de-
sire to strengthen the court.67 
CONCLUSION 
Precisely why William Marbury, William Harper, Robert 
Townsend Hooe, and Dennis Ramsay brought their suit in the 
United States Supreme Court will probably remain a mystery. 
All we can say with certainty is that the Circuit Court of the Dis-
trict of Columbia was up and running in 1801, that Marbury and 
his lawyer were clearly aware of that fact, that the Circuit Court 
had jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus in a case of this 
type, and that it was willing to exercise this power in the appro-
priate situation. Whether the Circuit Court would have done so 
if Marbury had sued there, and whether anyone knew the Su-
preme Court would find that it did not have original jurisdiction 
to do so, will probably never be known. But these questions pale 
in light of the profound impact of the resulting decision.68 
Whether by clever orchestration or mere serendipity, William 
Marbury's decision to sue in the Supreme Court, instead of the 
Circuit Court of the District of Columbia, profoundly impacted 
our constitutional history. With this relatively simple case, Chief 
Justice John Marshall was able to establish the power of the fed-
eral judiciary to review both executive and legislative actions, 
while "modestly" declining jurisdiction, ordering no one to do 
anything, and thus providing no opportunity for defiance or re-
sistance. It was a remarkable feat for which we are all in his 
debt. 
67. Marshall began the practice of writing opinions for the Court, instead of the 
prior practice of seriatim opinions. Here, too, Jefferson disapproved. In the 1823 letter 
to Judge Johnson, cited in note 51, Jefferson wrote: 
I rejoice in the example you set of seriatim opinions. I have heard it often no· 
ticed, and always with high approbation. Some of your brethren will be encour-
aged to follow it occasionally, and in time, it may be felt by all as a duty, and the 
sound practice of the primitive court be again restored. Why should not every 
judge be asked his opinion, and give it from the bench, if only by yea or nay? 
Besides ascertaining the fact of his opinion, which the public have a right to 
know, in order to judge whether it is impeachable or not, it would show whether 
the opinions were unanimous or not, and thus settle more exactly the weight of 
their authority. 
68. And perhaps Bacon, not Shakespeare, wrote the plays. But, in the end, what 
counts, in terms of our everlasting betterment, is that someone did. 
